

VZCZCXRO0228
RR RUEH DU RUEH GI RUEH JO RUEH MR RUEH PA RUEH RO V
DE RUEH UJA #0729/01 0931053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031053Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5102
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3727

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000729

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [SU](#) [NI](#)
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: PRONK WARNS UN TRANSITION
BEING UNDERMINED

1. (SBU) Summary: (SBU) UN Special Representative for Sudan Jan Pronk expressed his concern that the African Union's top leadership, including Alpha Omar Konare, does not support the transition of an AU force to UN in Sudan on April 1 and 2. Pronk told USDEL and international partners that Konare reportedly outlined for UNSG Kofi Annan the three options being considered by the AU in Sudan: continuing with AMIS, an augmented AMIS plus a "coalition of the willing", and the least favored option of a UN transition. According to Pronk, the AU executive is being manipulated by Khartoum and Tripoli to prevent an AMIS-UN transition. The lack of cooperation from Khartoum and the AU will affect the transition assessment due to the UNSC on April 24, further undermining efforts to attract troop contributors. Even more alarming is the prospect that AMIS forces will be paid for by the Government of Sudan and its Arab allies, an unacceptable development on all fronts. AU President Denis Sasou-Nguesso and Konare are expected in Abuja on April 8 for consultations with Obasanjo and the AU mediation. End Summary.

KONARE TO ANNAN: UN TRANSITION ONLY ONE OPTION

2, (SBU) On April 1, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk outlined to USDEL his concerns that the African Union (AU) Executive may be working against the transition to a UN force in Darfur. According to Pronk, AU Secretary General Alpha Konare meet with UNSG Kofi Annan last week. Konare allegedly reported that the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis supported the following options for Darfur: a continuation of AMIS as it is, an AMIS plus a "coalition of the willing" augmentation, and as a last resort, a transition to a UN force.

3. (SBU) Pronk also pointed out since the Government of Sudan began lobbying against a UN transition, the AMIS has been less cooperative with UN requests. He speculated that AU sector commanders may have been given instructions to refer all matters to Force Headquarters. These instructions are complicating and hampering ground operations, resulting in a situation in which there are more cease-fire violations occurring, but less AU monitoring. Pronk also noted that the enlarged AU force is less proactive than its smaller predecessor. Pronk was particularly critical of Konare for not attending the March 10 AU Peace and Security Council meeting and then allowing a range of interpretations of the PSC decision. As further evidence of the AU's weak position on transition, Pronk stated that the AU did not argue "very strongly" in favor a UN transition at the Arab League Summit in Khartoum.

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AU WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR UN TRANSITION
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14. (SBU) Pronk reiterated these concerns to international partners on April 2, but was even more direct in criticizing Konare for falling for GOS manipulation and allowing the possibility of GOS funding for AMIS. According to Pronk, Konare has stated that the AU PSC meeting on March 10 emphasized giving AMIS a new mandate rather than a transition to the UN. Pronk again stressed that, in his opinion, the AU executive views the AMIS transition to a UN force as a least favored option, which coincides with the GOS position. According to Pronk, the international community is now facing a situation in which AMIS will be funded by the GOS and Arab countries, a situation that the movements will find unacceptable. He said that the AU has decided that it will finance AMIS for four months, the GOS will furnish two months of funding, and the Arab League pledge would cover the force after October 1.

15. (SBU) Pronk said that without the consent of Sudan a UN mission in Darfur would be impossible. An overall peace agreement in Abuja could help to secure this consent. Pronk judged that President Bashir wants a full settlement, that the wealth- and power-sharing documents could be settled quickly, and that the security discussions were finally moving forward. Without a full agreement Bashir will oppose UN forces. He explained why further progress toward a full settlement now required a comprehensive security agreement, not an enhanced ceasefire. In turn, due to the limits of AU capacity, the UN would be required to take over the peace-keeping to meet the requirements of a full settlement.

16. (SBU) In response to questions, Pronk said that the UN
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had no evidence of direct GOS involvement in the recent fighting with Chad, but Arab militias had been involved. He warned that the rumored April 8 heads of state meeting in Abuja could be "highly risky", because the participation was both selective and arbitrary. At the end of the session he told the international partners that peace required a full package of texts, including a solution to disarming the janjaweed and demobilizing other forces. He said it was positive that all of the elements were finally on the table for discussion.

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ENHANCED HUMANITARIAN CEASE-FIRE NOT ENOUGH
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17. (SBU) The AU Mediation's determined pursuit of an Enhanced Humanitarian Cease-fire is not enough to allow for the transition to a UN force for Darfur and could become a "stumbling block" to the process, according to Pronk. He explained that despite his misgivings, he had supported the AU mediation's effort on EHCF if it did not lead to a deterioration of the situation on the ground or stop the negotiations on the comprehensive peace deal from moving ahead. Now, Pronk said, it is clear that the EHCF is not supported by any of the parties and does not provide for a UN transition. Pronk also said that the AU's continued postponement of key decisions prompted his approach to key UNSC members to encourage Khartoum to accept the joint AU-UN assessment mission.

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AU LEADERSHIP TO ABUJA
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18. (SBU) According to the AU Mediation, AU President Denis Sasou-Nguesso and Konare will be visiting Abuja for consultations with Obasanjo on April 8. Other heads of state are rumored to be coming. The AU has called a Joint Commission meeting in Addis Ababa from April 4-6 in advance

of an AU PSC meeting on April 6. Salim departed Abuja on April 2 for Dar Es Salam and then for Addis for the PSC meeting, to be back t Abuaj in time for the Sassou/Konare et.al. visit.

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COMMENT
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19. (SBU) In the absence of a full agreement, the government of Sudan and the AU leadership are keeping ideas for a continued AMIS mission in play, slowing down the UN transition process as well as the peace talks. It is important that the progress being made toward a full agreement not be derailed at either the PSC meeting in Addis or the April 8 meetings in Abuja. Pronk's visit helped to alert other international partners to these risks, but some European partners have a lingering attraction toward the idea of priority for a cease-fire text rather than for the full settlment needed for a UN transition.
CAMPBELL